Th is study investigates verbal irony comprehension by 6-year old bilingual children speaking Polish and English and living in the USA. Researchers have predominantly focused on monolingual populations when examining non-literal language in young children. Th is is the fi rst exploratory study of how irony is comprehended by children growing up in a bilingual sett ing. Results suggest that 6-year olds from this population score high in decoding the intended meaning behind an ironic utt erance and that there is a relation between this ability and the development of their theory of mind (ToM). Interestingly, the data suggests that in the tested sample, no diff erence could be observed between comprehension of sarcastic irony (i.e., irony containing the element of blame directed towards the addressee) and non-sarcastic irony (irony without criticism towards the interlocutor). Th e results may be a basis for assuming that irony comprehension may be diff erent in bilingual, compared to monolingual, samples.
Introduction
It is generally believed that more than half of the world's population is bilingual (Grosjean, 2010) . However, even though bilinguals make up a signifi cant portion of the society (Bialystok, Craik, & Luk, 2012) , a lot of research focuses solely on people who use only one language on an everyday basis. Monolingual, typically developing is considered a norm in language acquisition studies. Although there is an emerging body of research looking into lexical skills, morphosyntax, and executive functions of children who grow up in a multilingual sett ing, there is a gap in knowledge about their acquisition of fi gurative language, which forms a part of everyday communication in various cultural and linguistic contexts (Filippova, 2014) . One of the types or instances of fi gurative language use is verbal irony.
Irony is a common conversational device (Booth, 1974) , which is used frequently across communities. According to Dews and Winner (1999) , four instances of ironic utt erances occur in contemporary popular TV shows every half an hour. Gibbs (2000) claims that as much as 8% of all conversation turns among friends are ironic.
Irony makes use of the discrepancy between the listener's expectations and the actual state of the world. Th e prototypical form of irony is a counterfactual critical comment (i.e., sarcasm), where a statement which is positive on the surface conveys a negative meaning, such as "Great job!" utt ered in order to criticize somebody for their mistake or clumsiness (Filippova, 2014; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000) . Th is type of ironic remark is the one that is the most commonly used among other instances of verbal irony (Dews et al., 1996) , and also earliest acquired and fi rst understood by children (Filippova & Astington, 2008; Harris & Pexman, 2003; Pexman, & Glenwright, 2007) . However, the term "irony" is much broader: It includes humoristic comments, understatements, circumlocutions, and rhetorical questions, to name a few (Gibbs, 1986; Utsumi, 2004) . In the literature, there are many competing defi nitions trying to describe what irony actually is (Att ardo, 2000; Clark & Gerrig, 1984; Kreuz & Gluecksberg, 1989; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995; Wilson & Sperber, 1992) . Barbe (1995) decides not to defi ne irony, but instead to characterize or describe it. According to her, in an ironic statement, the surface meaning is diff erent than the real, intended meaning. Th e relation between the two meanings does not necessarily need to be an opposition, such as saying "Great job!" or "Th at was clever!" in order to criticize somebody for making a mistake and hence implying a message of "You did it wrong!", but may be much more subtle. Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989, p. 374 ) defi ned verbal irony as a statement that presents something that is not literally true and at the same time expresses an att itude. Th is defi nition overlaps to some extent with the description provided by Barbe (1995) , although the latt er seems to be a more precise one, by indicating the diff erence of the two meanings and not necessarily referring to something that is not literally true, as the former does. For instance, in a situation where a person went on a blind date and was asked later how the date went, answers with "He had nice shoes" (an example used by Barbe, 1995) , there is no reason to question the factual state of the reply. However, it is the choice of information that makes the statement ironic. Omitt ing information that is expected and instead saying something else adds a supplementary meaning and makes it possible to infer that there was something wrong with the date if the only given information refers to the fact that the shoes were nice, which might actually be true.
An important part of the description of irony that Barbe (1995) , unlike Kreuz and Glucksberg (1989) , does not include is adding some att itudes -that is, extra information conveyed with the meaning. Th e component of att itude is also adopted by Milanowicz (2013) , who claims that irony is used not only to describe the circumstances of events but also to express the att itude and feelings of interlocutors.
Th e type of the irony used in the study material is a prototypical irony, where the two meanings -the surface and the intended one -are in opposition to one another. Th is will be explained in more detail in the Method section.
Development of Irony Comprehension in Young Children
Comprehension of verbal irony is a complex cognitive process ( Ackerman, 1983; Filippova & Astington, 2008; Recchia, Howe, Ross, & Alexander 2010; Winner & Leekam, 1991) . In studies on children's comprehension of irony, it has been shown that the process occurs late in development (Pexman & Glenwright, 2007) . However, there is no agreement as to when the ability develops and what age can be considered as the youngest at which ironic statements may be decoded correctly. According to the research conducted by Dews et al. (1996) , 5-year-olds lack the ability to understand ironic assertions, contrary to the group of 6-year-olds. Th is fi nding was at that time coherent with previous studies of that topic, none of which have indicated irony comprehension below the age of six (Ackerman, 1982; Andrews, Rosenblatt , Malkus, Gardner, & Winner, 1986; Demorest, Meyer, Phelps, Gardner, & Winner, 1983; Demorest, Silberstein, Gardner, & Winner, 1984; Winner et al., 1987 ). An investigation held by Filippova and Astington (2010) has showed a similar tendency. In their study, 5-year-olds fell behind children aged seven and nine in reasoning about the social-cognitive aspects of irony (i.e., the speaker's meaning, belief, intention, and motivation). Milanowicz and Bokus (2011) found that it is between the age of fi ve and six when children develop the comprehension of the intended meaning of an ironic speaker.
But some more recent research (Banasik, 2013; Banasik & Bokus, 2012; Recchia et al., 2010) showed that children as young as 4 may be able to comprehend ironic statements. It is unclear whether the variability in research results stems from the diff erences in methodologies, various samples of children that do not share the same cultural and linguistic backgrounds, or the historic time and the environment type that infl uences communicative styles (such as more exposure to visual media and diff erent narratives changing over the decades). Th e problem needs to be addressed by more research using new methods that take into account children's linguistic abilities, as well as by replicating classic studies from the fi eld. However, there seems to be a signifi cant gap in research on how fi gurative language is understood by bilingual children. Th is population is special and worthy of att ention not only due to the fact that increasingly more people in the world are bilingual but also because the development of the theory of mind (ToM) among bilinguals is usually more advanced than in a similar population speaking just one language (Bialystok, 2001; Goetz, 2003) . ToM has been shown to be related to comprehension of ironic utt erances, which is described in the following section.
When it comes to comprehension of various irony types, some studies led to the conclusions that the ability to comprehend ironic criticism is acquired long before the comprehension of ironic compliments (Harris & Pexman, 2003; Pexman & Glenwright, 2007) , and this seems understandable due to the higher frequency of ironic criticisms in everyday discourse (Gibbs, 2000) . Even adults consider the interpretation of ironic compliments to be more diffi cult than ironic criticisms (Pexman & Zvaigzne, 2004) .
Th e reason why understanding irony is diffi cult for children may be related to the specifi city of interaction as well as to the context-dependence (Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989) . One needs to understand the presence of the duality of meaning in the utt erance, that is, that there is both a surface meaning and an intended one, which is hidden (Barbe 1995; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989) . Also, it is important to know that the knowledge that the speaker possesses is shared by the addressee. In other words, being able to relate to the other person's thoughts, intentions, and emotions, which is oft en labeled with the umbrella term of ToM, is a crucial part of irony comprehension (Banasik, 2013; Huang, Oi, & Taguchi, 2015) . To sum up, to understand irony is to grasp the other person's intent, as well as the two confl icting meanings, and to be able to acknowledge the real one.
Irony Comprehension and Th eory of Mind
Th eory of Mind is defi ned as the cognitive ability to recognize and att ribute mental states to both oneself and other people as well as to understand that other people may have thoughts, beliefs, and emotions diff erent than oneself (Astington, 1993; Flavell & Miller, 1985) .
A signifi cant body of research claims that children seem to have diffi culties in understanding complex mental states before the age of four (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) , even though young infants are sensitive to certain mental contents such as goal-directedness and intentionality (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995) . One of the standard tasks measuring this ability is the false belief task, which is based on a situation where one character's understanding of the situation contrasts with the subject's knowledge. For instance, one protagonist of a story presented to a child hides an object in location A. While the character is absent, a second protagonist moves the object from location A to location B. Th e tested child is then asked where the fi rst protagonist will look for the object.
Verbal irony, just as the false belief task, requires from the addressee the ability to hold two confl icting representations and to choose between them. In ironic statements, two meanings are communicated: one that is hidden-the intended, real meaning -and one that is the surface meaning that one needs to discard. Sharing this aspect of discrepancy may explain the correlation between irony comprehension and ToM obtained in a number of studies (Banasik, 2013; Filippova & Astington, 2008; Happé, 1993; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfi eld, 1995) . Children younger than fi ve years old and autistic people, who have been shown to demonstrate low scores in ToM, do not deal well with understanding irony (Dews et al., 1996; Happé, 1993; Harris & Pexman, 2003; McDonald, 2000) . Additionally, some brain imaging research data suggests that the same brain regions that are responsible for mentalizing are also involved in decoding ironic utt erances (Shibata et al, 2010; Uchiyama et al., 2006; Wakusawa et al., 2007) .
Whereas the data suggests that the more advanced the ability to mentalize in monolingual children, the bett er their skill to comprehend ironic utt erances, there has been no research to see if a similar patt ern can be observed in bilingual children, who, as will be explained in the next section, are generally believed to obtain higher scores in ToM tasks than their monolingual peers.
Th eory of Mind and Bilingualism
Th ere is evidence showing that bilingualism facilitates high performance in standard ToM tasks (Goetz, 2003; Kovács, 2009) , possibly because, in a bilingual sett ing, one needs to deal with confl icting representations and ambiguous input (Kovács, 2009) . Bilinguals need to recognize the fact that they would use diff erent code (selection of words in particular language) depending on the person they are speaking with and the addressee's familiarity with one or another language (Goetz, 2003) . Th ey become aware that knowledge of their interlocutor diff ers from their own, and this awareness may be helpful while resolving ToM tasks. Goetz (2003) examinedthree groups of 3-, and 4-year-olds: Chinese monolinguals, English monolinguals, and bilinguals speaking Chinese and English. For most of the tasks (including appearance-reality task, perspective-taking task, false-belief unexpected contents task), the bilinguals performed bett er than their monolingual peers. Goetz explains these results with the constant requirement of adapting messages to linguistically diff erent addressees that bilingual children face every day. Kovács argues that highly developed ToM in bilinguals may be related to their inhibitory skills and representational competencies (the awareness of an alternative representation of a certain object). Taking into account the relation between irony comprehension and ToM described in the previous section, it might be hypothesized that bilingual children would also do bett er in fi gurative language recognition and grasping the intended meaning of an ironic utt erance.
Research Qu estions & Hypotheses
Th e aim of the presented study was to explore the way ironic utt erances are comprehended by children who grow up in a bilingual sett ing. We were interested in how accurate they are in decoding the actual meaning of an ironic comment and whether their score is correlated with their ability to recognize thoughts, intentions, and emotions of other people. Also, we tried to examine if some of the expressions were more diffi cult than others and whether the factor of including the blame element, that is, personal criticism towards the addressee of the speaker, was of importance to the accuracy -that is, if either sarcastic or non-sarcastic comments were more diffi cult to children. Based on existing data from monolingual children (Winner et al, 1987) , we hypothesized that sarcastic comments (i.e., ones including the blame element) would be more diffi cult to children than non-sarcastic ones (comments not directing the blame towards the addressee).
Th e specifi c research questions were as follows:
1. What is the accuracy rate of irony comprehension in 6-year-old bilingual children speaking Polish and English? 2. Is there a relation between results in the Irony Comprehension Task (ICT) and the ToM Task (ToMT)? 3. Are there diff erences in accuracy between blame and non-blame irony?
Methodology
Children who took part in the study were recruited in one of the Polish Saturday schools in the area of Boston. Parents who agreed for their children to be tested were asked to provide information about the languages spoken at home and the perceived level of profi ciency in each of the languages. If both the parent and the teacher described the child's fl uency as at least communicative in both English and Polish, the child was included in the study. Th e language of the testing was Polish. Before the testing, the experimenter spent about four hours in the classroom engaging in activities with children in order to reduce the eff ect of shyness and intimidation. Additionally, this time was used to make observations about the children's linguistic and social behavior. Also, the Cross-linguistic Vocabulary Task (Haman, Łuniewska, Pomiechowska, 2015) was included in the tasks to control for vocabulary knowledge in Polish. Th e results were not included in the analysis, but the data was used to make the decisions about excluding a result from the study due to a low vocabulary score, which may result in obstacles for the child in comprehending the tasks and diffi culties in responding to the question. Th is was the case for three children. All of the children were att ending American schools, where the language of instruction was English.
In the sample, 31 bilingual children were presented with several tasks, including the ICT, and then asked to answer a series of questions. Th e questions checked the children's understanding of the intended utt erance meaning (non-literal vs. literal). In the fi nal analysis, data of 28 children (M age = 71.86 months, SD = 5.4; 13 girls and 15 boys) were included.
For the purpose of the analysis, we focused on two types of ironic comments: those that refer directly to the addressee and can be understood as criticism because they include an element of blame and the ones that reference a general situation but are not a direct comment on the addressee's behavior or feature, and thus are more neutral. Another task that was used was the Refl ection on Th inking Test (TRM; Białecka-Pikul, 2012) . Th e tasks are described in detail in the following section.
Materials
For the purpose of this study, we used the ICT (Banasik & Bokus, 2012) , which is a story comprehension task consisting of 12 stories. Six of the stories include an utt erance which is counterfactual and interpreted as ironic by adult speakers of Polish. Six of the stories involve the character saying something that is interpreted as a literal comment to the depicted situation. Th e stories were controlled for length (number of words in each story), morphosyntactic complexity (simple or compound sentences were used, but not complex ones), diffi culty of words (words already acquired), and dyads of characters in the story who say the ironic utt erance (child to child vs. adult to child). Th e pictures were presented on a large screen connected to a computer, together with a pre-recorded audio material where ironic utt erances were read with a marked prosody. Children were then asked to answer a series of questions. Th e accuracy score was measured by an answer to a question in which the child had to choose one of two options where the meaning of the utt erance was represented. For instance, when the child heard the story where one of the characters said "We are so lucky today!" in response to everything going wrong (the characters missed the bus, it started raining), the child heard the question: "When mommy said 'We are so lucky today!', did she mean that… ", followed by the next screen with two pictures and audio of "Everything went well and they are lucky today (fi rst picture) or everything went wrong and they are not lucky today (second picture)?". Children replied by pressing the touch screen where a picture representing the right answer was displayed next to a picture representing the incorrect answer that is the literal meaning in the case of ironic comments. Th e transcripts of the English version of the ICT are presented in the Appendix. For the version in Polish, see Banasik (2013) . Ironic utt erances included in the task could be classifi ed into two categories. Although all of them were a type of the simplest, most commonly used, and earliest understood irony, that is, irony where the two layers of meaning are based on the relation of opposition to one another, half of the utt erances were referencing the addressee directly by commenting on their behavior or an att ribute, such as "You are so clean!" when the protagonist fell down and landed in a muddy puddle, and the other half presented a statement that was a comment on the situation or the outside world rather than the addressee themselves, for example, "We are so lucky today" utt ered when everything goes wrong.
To check for children's development of ToM, we used the TRM (Białecka--Pikul, 2012) . Th e TRM, which is an original task constructed on the basis of an exhaustive literature review (Białecka-Pikul, 2012) , uses a set of stories constructed in such a way that they include various aspects of ToM, that is, visual perspective understanding, emotion and intention understand ing, pretense and imagination, understanding states of knowledge and degrees of knowledge certainty, remembering and forgett ing, recognition of appearance versus reality, understanding of verbal ambiguity, and un derstanding of deception. Th e task enables an analysis which is twofold: A basic, quantitative one, including the accuracy of the children's responses to the questions about the character's behaviors, and a qualitative one that provides children's interpretations of the character's actions through their answers to the open-ended question of "Why?"
Procedure
Th e current study is a part of a larger project where both monolingual and bilingual children are tested with a set of tasks. Children were tested with the ICT (Banasik & Bokus, 2012) and the TRM (Białecka-Pikul, 2012) .
Th e study was conducted on the school premises. Children were tested individually. Th e experimenter fi rst tried to get to know the child and then acquainted him or her with the procedure and the equipment used (the computer, the touch screen, and the sound recording device). Aft er that, the test proceeded. Th e stories in the ICT were prerecorded and displayed to the children during the session together with the picture stimuli on a large (21.5 in.) touch screen. Aft er doing a trial test, the children responded to the questions by touching the screen and answering the questions aloud, which was recorded by the sound recording device. Th e stories in the TRM were displayed on the computer screen and read to the child by the experimenter. Th e order of tasks was counterbalanced.
Results
Th e results indicate that the children scored relatively high on the ICT. Th e mean results for ironic and literal statements are presented in Figure 1 below.
On average, children recognized the correct meaning behind the ironic utt erance in 73% of all ironic stories and understood that the character meant to convey the literal meaning in 82% of the stories with a non-fi gurative comment. Th is indicates results high above chance.
A signifi cant correlation was found between accuracy in the ICT and results in the ToM Task (r = 0.67, p < 0.000), even though the variance in the TRM in the tested sample was quite small. While the possible score has the range of 0 to 12, the obtained results varied from 5 to 9 (M = 6.96, SD = 1.2).
A t-test for dependent samples was run in order to compare the mean results for answers in case of blame irony (stories with sarcastic comment) and non-blame irony (stories with a non-sarcastic ironic comment). The results are presented in Figure 2 . No signifi cant diff erence was found. Th e mean accuracy for sarcastic (blame) irony was slightly higher (M = 2.21, SD = 0.96) than for non-sarcastic (non-blame) irony (M = 2.18, SD = 0.94) but it was far below the level of statistical signifi cance. Th is is an interesting result, contradictory to what has been found with studies in monolingual children (Andrews et al., 1986; Happé, 1993; Banasik & Bokus, 2016 
Discussion
Th e purpose of the present study was to investigate how verbal irony is comprehended by bilingual children. In particular, we were interested in accuracy rates in tasks measuring the comprehension of ironic comments, their relation to the level of ToM development, and the diff erence in sarcastic versus non-sarcastic irony. To the authors' best knowledge, there has been no research so far on the topic addressing the problem of early understanding of ironic utt erances in non-monolingual sett ings. We measured accuracy in the ICT and the TRM. Th e results suggest that bilingual 6-year-olds can very well recognize the real meaning behind ironic utt erances. Th e mean score for comprehending ironic statements was 73%. Th is result is consistent with some newer studies on irony comprehension by children which show that children even younger than six years are eff ective in recognizing the ironist's intention (Banasik, 2013; Banasik & Bokus, 2012; Milanowicz & Bokus, 2011; Recchia et al., 2010; ) . Also, we hypothesized that bilingual children should be bett er in fi gurative language comprehension due to the fact of generally higher ToM scores and having to process linguistic ambiguity on everyday basis, as well as because of generally higher metalinguistic abilities. Although there is no other bilingual study that would be parallel to this one, some researchers found that it is not until the age of seven or eight years that monolingual children acquire this ability, which is contradictory to our results (Ackerman, 1982; Andrews et al., 1986; Demorest et al., 1983 Demorest et al., , 1984 Winner et al., 1987) . Clearly, more research is needed on the topic, and at this point it is impossible to conclude whether in fact bilingual children may achieve higher scores in tasks measuring fi gurative language comprehension. We did fi nd, as we expected, that there is a relation between the level of ToM development and children's performance on the ICT. Th is fi nding is consistent with previous research on the topic conducted with monolingual children (Creusere, 2007; Winner et al, 1987) . Comprehending irony is impossible without being able to predict the speaker's intentions.
Results of the study showed no evidence for a higher accuracy rate in decoding sarcastic than non-sarcastic ironic utt erance. Th is result is surprising and diff ers from fi ndings reported in the literature (Creusere, 2007; Winner et al, 1987) . We assume that this result might be explained by the culture eff ect. Americans prefer a direct, straightforward style of addressing their interlocutors (Ting-Toomey, 1999) , which may be refl ected in the way parents use or do not use non-literal language (i.e., irony) in their child-directed speech. Parental linguistic input is known to infl uence children's comprehension (Hoff 2003; Hutt enlocher, 1991) . Eastern European culture, on the other hand, relies heavily on the use of fi gurative speech because of the tradition of the need to convey meanings that would not be understood by the authorities (Barta, 2013) . It is possible that with no training in listening to and processing of sarcastic comments, children do not understand them bett er than non-sarcastic ironic comments. In other words, children who, in our study, were capable of understanding irony understood sentences containing the element with blame equally well as the ones without the blame element because none of the expression types were more familiar to them. Behind this att empt at explaining the results, there is an assumption that because of their place of living, people may adopt communicative practices and values that refl ect to some degree the ones used in their environment.
Further research exploring the factor of culture, child-directed speech specifi city and using irony towards children, as well as the relation between irony comprehension and the exposure to fi gurative language, is needed and could help understand both the results of the present study as well as to contribute to a broader understanding of the process behind decoding fi gurative language.
Our study may be a starting point for further research that takes the topic of irony comprehension to bilingual communities.
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3. When Annie said 'Th is sweater is awful!', was it:
-very funny -kind of funny -not funny at all 4. When Annie said: 'Th is sweater is awful!', was she:
- 
